The idea that the future is already determined is known in philosophy as determinism. There are various definitions of determinism available; but in this essay, I shall use the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition, which is ‘the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future
This idea presents a difficult problem for the concept of free will: how can we make free choices if all our actions are determined by the facts of the past and the laws of nature? A related but distinct question is: how can we be held morally responsible for our actions if we have no free will?
Undesirable consequences like these are not sufficient reasons for declaring determinism to be false; but they can act as a powerful motivator towards resolving the apparent conflict between determinism and free will.
Some philosophers, such as Peter van Inwagen have gone as far as arguing that the existence of moral responsibility entails the existence of free will
In this essay, I intend to argue that a solution to this dilemma lies not in choosing free will over determinism, nor vice versa; but in the theory that determinism and free will are compatible – known as compatibilism.
Before going on, let us be clear about what we mean by the term free will.
‘To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—it is up to her whether she does one thing
Are you choosing to read this essay? Or are you just constrained by the laws of nature? David Hume describes The Problem of Free Will as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics’. Initial exploration into this school of thought gave rise to several philosophical viewpoints supported by modern thinkers. Hard determinism bases its viewpoint on the strict theory of causality, rejecting the idea of free will. On the contrary, Libertarianism opposes this, supporting the concept of free will and denying that a deterministic universe exists. Both of these arguments adhere to incompatibilism as they refute the coexistence of both notions. Subsequently, 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume (1748) procured his influential proposal of compatibilism, attempting to resolve the debate as he argues that free will necessitates determinism. In this essay, with reference to Eddington and Pink’s work I will evaluate the validity of these viewpoints conveying that free will is conceptually illogical and demonstrate that Hume’s compatibility cannot overcome these flaws due to his unsatisfactory definition of free will as pointed out by Robert Taylor. Consequently, the existence of free will for humans is impossible.
The subject of freewill and determinism has been a matter of intense debate in the philosophical community for ages with the topic of compatibilism and incompatibilism. This essay will be reviewing and critiquing the work of a very well-known philosopher Peter Van Inwagen and his article “An Argument For Incompatibilism” and what does he mean by freewill and determinism.
The arguments presented by D’Holbach and Hobart contain many of the same premises and opinions regarding the human mind, but nonetheless differ in their conclusion on whether we have free will. In this paper, I will explain how their individual interpretations of the meaning of free will resulted in having contrary arguments.
I want to argue that there is indeed free will. In order to defend the position that free will means that human beings can cause some of what they do on their own; in other words, what they do is not explainable solely by references to factors that have influenced them. My thesis then, is that human beings are able to cause their own actions and they are therefore responsible for what they do. In a basic sense we are all original actors capable of making moves in the world. We are initiators of our own behavior.
An individual with “Free Will” is capable of making vital decisions and choices in life with own free consent. The individual chooses these decisions without any outside influence from a set of “alternative possibilities.” The idea of “free will” imposes a certain kind of power on an individual to make decisions of which he or she is morally responsible. This implies that “free will” would include a range of aspects such as originality, moral value, and self-governance. However, in life, individuals may not be free in making decisions. The aspect of freedom could entail remarkably a high status action and achievement in an individual’s life whose attainment could be close to impossibility. Often, people make
The focus of this essay will be an argument by Peter Van Inwagen known as the “Consequence Argument.” The argument’s main goal is to refute compatibilism, or the idea that free will and determinism are reconcilable. Van Inwagen’s argument can be expressed as follows:
In his essay, “An Argument for Incompatibilism,” Peter van Inwagen concludes that free will and determinism cannot be compatible. The type of argument that van Inwagen uses, the Consequence Argument, has become the maxime popularis way for incompatibilists to assert that, determinism, and free will, are in conflict. The Consequence Argument attempts to display that, if there is an assumption that determinism is true, and then there is a further assumption that for any action that has taken place, up to a specific point, the agent never had a choice about the action taken. Then the consequence is there can be no free action of the agent. Therefore, no free will.
In this essay I will argue D’Hollbach’s argument on that everything is pre-determined, and that there is no free will at all, just pre-arranged determinates. I will argue and show what points and flaws D’Hollbach has with his arguments on hard determinism.
Whether we have free will is widely controversial. The absence of a universal definition poses a primary problem to this question. In this essay, I shall base my argument on a set of three conditions for free will: 1) that the actor is unconstraint in his action, 2) the actor could have acted otherwise and 3) the actor must be ‘ultimately responsible’ (Kane, 2005: 121) for his action. After I have explained them, I shall apply these conditions to three scenarios that cover most, if not any, circumstances that occur when taking choices. The purpose of this essay is to show that if my conditions are true, none of the scenarios is based on free will and thus we do not have free will.
Determinism claims that all human behavior or actions are predictable due to preceding factors such as laws of science and antecedent events. Correspondingly, it could be said that these actions are caused by the environment-more specifically in physical and psychological reinforces and punishments.
The controversial metaphysical debate of free will in philosophy revolves around the blatant discordancy between casual determinism and society’s perception of free will. In Philosophy by Manuel Velasquez, he describes this debate as “a controversy that still rages in our society” (p. 202). The three foremost theories that are used in this deliberation are hard determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Philosophers defend and believe in each one of these theories based upon their individual characteristics.
In order to better understand the arguments of Skinner and Kane, we must first understand the concept of determinism.
In this essay I will explain why I think the strongest position of the free will debate is that of the hard determinists and clarify the objection that moral responsibility goes out the door if we don’t have free will by addressing the two big misconceptions that are associated with determinists: first that determinism is an ethical system, and secondly that contrary to common belief determinists do believe in the concept of cause and effect. I will also begin by explaining my position and why I believe that the position of the indeterminist does not hold water as an argument and the third
The notion of predetermined human action poses many threats to the human perception of free will, as free will is a commonly accepted component of the human experiment. There are several ways to respond to this dilemma, the first being the following deductive argument made by hard determinists. Firstly, if determinism is true, then free will is impossible. Secondly, determinism is true. Therefore, free will must be impossible. The aftermath of this reasoning seems to lead to no person ever being responsible for their actions, whether good or bad, because events are all inevitably predetermined.
Without free will and its adherent responsibility and commitment there could be neither reward nor punishment.