Kohler Case Study I. Enterprise Value of Kohler Tax Rate = 34% Debt to Value = .464 or 681,038/1,467,373 Debt to Equity = .536 or 786,335/1,467,373 Risk Free Rate = 20 yr government bond = 6.0% Market Return on Debt = 6% Market Return on Equity = 2002 Net income/ Average Stockholder’s equity 1998-2002 108,229/924,800= 11.7% WACC: (1-.34)*(.06)*(.464)+ (.117)*(.536)= 8.11% II. Estimated Share Price of Kohler - $55,400 vs. $270,000 The $55,400 price per share is an undervalued figure because it is presuming that Kohler will remain a private company in the future with the same ownership structure that it presently maintains. After analyzing the projected balance sheets, projected income statements, and projected …show more content…
The share price of $270,000 was significantly higher because the “fair value” as perceived by the dissenters, which accounted for the chance of an IPO. Taking into account the recently traded Kohler Co. share prices, the book value of a share, and the possibility of an IPO greatly inflated what the perceived value of each share should be. While Kohler believed their voting control and ownership structure would remain the same, the shareholders believed otherwise. Because shareholders assumed Kohler would go public, they argued for a higher valuation so as to receive the highest price, and thus profit, in the buyout. So based on the highest MVE, we picked Masco as the comparable firm of choice. Using Masco’s MVE, $9838.8, and LTM EBIAT, $437.3, we solved for Masco’s P/E ratio, which was equal to 22.5. By multiplying the P/E ratio by Kohler’s LTM EBIAT (22.5 * $93.76), we projected a market value of $2,109,610,000. To solve for estimated share price, we divided the projected market value by 7,587.89, the number of shares outstanding to obtain an estimated share price of $278,023.47. This estimate is near the $270,000 per share offer price. III. Maximum Share Price For Settlement The maximum share price, if Herbert Kohler is willing to settle with the dissenting shareholders to stop the trail on April 11, 2000, is $120,680. Given the probability of the two outcomes, the expected price for $273,000 per share claim (probability 30%) was $81,900 and the
We also know that Louis was contemplating a possible IPO exit strategy before the end of the holding period term. To estimate a multiple for this IPO exit, we need to look at the Price/Earnings ratio for Dollarama. Using the same methodology as above, we compared Dollarama to the same group of companies and computed the average P/E ratio for the set, see Exhibit 6a. We will consider the values for the year 2005 and will take a multiple of 24.6 for an eventual IPO exit.
Our reconciliation for this undervaluation is that the market is already pricing in a takeover. Some evidence of this can be demonstrated by the 1.0 beta of paramount. If we look at the 1992 Q1 to August 30 1993 returns of S&P500 and PCI, PCI is +30.6% and S&P500 is +14.6%, which implies an approximate
Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, as discussed in Darden Business Publishing Case UVA-F-1479, appears to be at a crossroads. After years of astronomical growth, the company find its share price plummeting in the midst of discoveries about faulty accounting practices. The following paper examines several issues behind the sudden decline First, the historical income statements and balance sheets are examined to determine the financial health and current condition of the company. This is followed by an analysis of key financial ratios across time and versus industry standards. Next, the paper addresses if Krispy Kreme is financially healthy at year-end 2003 and, if so, what accounts for the firm’s recent share price decline. The paper concludes
6.4. The multiples give a valuation range of $91.85 to $148.23. The EPS and Sales multiples are close to the industry average giving a range value very close to the offer price - $91.85-$95.09. The EPS and Book value are very much affected by the leverage structure and thus may be not a true representation.
The $55 value is on the lower range of the analyst eztimates, with a best guess estimate of $67.94. Since the value of the stock had been below $45 for 4 months, the offer of 55 dollars represented a 29% premium to investors. Bollenbach knew that management would be resistant of any attempt to be acquired, regardless of price, because of failed previous attempts to negotiate a friendly merger at year end 1996. The 55-dollar benchmark created an expectation for ITT management to achieve that level, or higher and the premium is enough to demonstrate to investors it is a real offer. Their support will be key as they will have a
The management of JetBlue and its underwriters can also price the IPO using valuation multiples. JetBlue can employ the most current comparable data of the most appropriate competitors in terms of value in the airline industry. Valuation multiples that can be employed include, but are not limited to P/E multiples, EBIT multiples, EBITDA multiples. In this scenario, I choose to use Southwest airlines and Ryanair as the major benchmarks, because they are both considered as major low –fare airlines, and are key competitors in the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, I believe the P/E ratio is the stronger valuation tool to determine the true value of a firm. Using this method we come up with a share price of $19.32 for Southwest
Most rely on valuation heuristics involving P/E, PEG, and price-to-sales . The simplicity of using heuristic triggers dependence on valuation heuristics as an alternative for the fundamental valuation. P/E, PEG, and price-to-sales need few variables and use simple formulas. Therefore , the estimates are rather perceptive THUS subject to bias. The cause of these biases arise from weak assumption made towards P/E, PEG, and price-to-sales inputs.
The suggestions we are showing make the model more aggressive in how it determines the value of a firm, but we believe that would provide a more accurate representation of the firm’s value. The current valuation model is overly conservative, which is good news when it comes to making a buying decision.
The intrinsic value of Facebook stock was very difficult to find, since the company is relatively new and has been growing at an extreme rate. Based on the most recent sale of Facebook stock via a private transaction the per share price was $44 in March. However, based on the DCF analysis by professor Aswath Damodaran the intrinsic value of a single Facebook share would be $32.44. The problem is whenever using DCF analysis; the analysis is very sensitive to all assumptions uses, which were plenty in the case of Facebook. The price talk from underwriters varied immensely within the time from of February when the Red Herring was filed, all the way to May. At the very beginning, price talks were anywhere from $20 – mid $30’s. They were set to offer 337,415,352 shares. As the broader market continued in bullish trend and momentum for the Facebook IPO became greater. Price talks now shifted to $28-$35 range. Knowing that demand for the stock was said to be growing it was noted that many IPO are priced conservative to leave room for a pop on the first day of trading. On May 11 CNBC made a statement along the lines that demand was much greater than supply for the stock. Shortly after on May 14, the price talks had now moved to $34-$38 range and now offering 421,233,615 shares, the additional shares were all of insiders. This would set the companies valuation at
Our nation has suffered through a recession for the past decade. Small and large businesses, alike, have suffered directly resulting in American jobs being lost, the national debt skyrocketing into the trillions, and parents struggling to keep food on the table for their children. Foresight is a trait that a business owners, or executives, must possess to lead their company in profitable times, and navigate through turbulent times. One of the most significant events in the life of any company is becoming publically traded; when a company “goes
4. The article said that K12 was the closest comparable company to Rosetta Stone. Rosetta Stone is marketable to a larger consumer base than K12, so I think that it should be able to charge a higher IPO. The case said that book was more than 25 times oversubscribed during its road show which means Rosetta Stone could charge a much higher price. But these subscriptions are volatile and the economy is recovering, so a price too high could deter many investors. For my analysis I took the EBITDA margin for years 2006-2008 and found the average increase during that time to be 9.93%. I then took the estimated share value from 2008 and multiplied it by 1.0993 to factor in the average increase in share value. This resulted in a price of $19.22. Given this number I would increase the current range from $15-17 to $19-24. The reason for the increased range is because of the
It can fairly be said that an Investor considering an investment decision (whether to purchase, sell or hold stock) in publicly traded company acts on the basis of extensive information which is available by corporation to him until the last moment of his investing decision and try to determine the fair price of corporate stock. In the light of continuous creation of a particular impression of corporate affairs by the corporation, new information by corporate can vanish the importance of previous available information to investor. In the scenario only one kind of investors can get advantage over others, who is either very close to corporate operation (corporate officers) or can access nonpublic price-sensitive information to corporation
In the summer of 2008, InBev NV, a Belgian-based brewing company formed from the merger of InterBrew and AmBev, offered a bid of $46.6 billion to acquire Anheuser-Busch Co to create the world’s largest brewing company at $65 a share. The initial offer was subsequently declined in part because the company felt the offer undervalued the company greatly. InBev later increased their offer to $70 a share and in Mid-July, Anheuser-Busch accepted the offer making the total cost of the deal $54.8 billion dollars. The issue then becomes whether the offer of $70 is justifiable to InBev’s shareholders. The merger brings about two different management styles. The culture at InBev focused on extreme cost-cutting measures and profitable incentive-based compensation programs. However, Anheuser-Busch’s culture differed in that they prided itself on philanthropy, diversity, and community involvement. In addition, this company possessed many luxurious offices and corporate fleet of aircrafts. Furthermore, they invested heavily in advertising, derived most of their profits in the United States, and possessed a lackluster international expansion plan. Issues the financial managers face will be differing business philosophies in regards to marketing (“Grow/Defend/Maintain/Cash” matrix approach vs the large marketing budget of Anheuser-Busch), culture (cost cutting measures vs company perks), and the future of the twelve
3. How might Eastboro's various providers of capital, such as stockholders and creditors, react if Eastboro declares a dividend in 2001?
Tied in with projections for commodity pricing is the undervaluation of the company. A major incentive for management in this buyout is clearly this undervaluation. KMI had been valued between $100 and 120 a share, yet was trading at only $84. KMI had experienced five years of increasing revenues and its net income was on an upward trend. KMI was financially healthy and its vast infrastructure would only continue to generate cash flows. It was a perfect buy-low scenario for the investors that knew the firm the best, the managers.