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Sucklal's Argument Against Racial Profiling

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Finally, Sucklal argues that she was denied an adequate opportunity to be heard with respect to the motions hearings on September 26, 2013, and September 5, 2014. At the outset we note that an appellant has a responsibility to cite us to “the facts material to a determination of the questions presented.” Md. Rule 8-504(a)(4). Indeed, “we cannot be expected to delve through the record to unearth factual support favorable to the appellant.” Rollins v. Capital Plaza Assoc., L.P., 181 Md. App. 188, 201 (2008). In her brief, Sucklal makes bald assertions that she was denied due process, but fails to articulate the specific circumstances that give rise to such claims. The deficiencies in the arguments notwithstanding, after a through review …show more content…

Procedural due process, however, does not require the court to abandon the procedural and evidentiary devices that keep the content of proceedings focused on the issues at hand so that a litigant may convert the courtroom to a soapbox from which to air their grievances with a system with which they disagree. Indeed, “[i]t is an essential function of the court to maintain order and assure propriety in the conduct of legal proceedings . . . .” Calder v. Levi, 168 Md. 260, 274 (1935). “Moreover, ‘there is no question that the trial judge has broad discretion to control the conduct in his or her courtroom . . . .’” In re Elrich S., 416 Md. 15, 36 …show more content…

GSMC and Ocwen objected to the statement and the objection was sustained. “[W]ith respect to evidentiary rulings on admissibility generally and rulings with respect to relevance specifically, the trial judge is vested with wide, wide discretion.” Schmitt v. State, 140 Md. App. 1, 17 (2001). Here, Sucklal was prohibited from testifying as to the contents of the correspondence because Md. Rule 5-1002 requires that “[t]o prove the content of a writing . . ., the original writing . . . is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute.” Likewise, Sucklal was prohibited from testifying as to statements made by the author of the correspondence because Md. Rule 5-802 generally prohibits the admission of “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Md. Rule 5-801(c). Finally, litigants must be afforded “a reasonable opportunity to present material that may be pertinent to the court’s decision as required by Maryland Rule 2-501.” Balt. Street Builders v. Stewart, 186 Md. App. 684, 691 (2009). Sucklal, however, was not denied an opportunity to oppose GSMC and Ocwen’s motion for summary judgement. Indeed, Sucklal failed to respond to the motion for summary

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