Summary: Key Assumptions Check

Putting the data into related groups that will either confirm, enhance or disagree with each group of data. The process of synthesizing the information, using the current data, past history of the subject(s), and additional relevant information, begins toward a final conclusion.

With this process, is where one can start to see the issue and conflict of interest. Human error is an issue that has always been a factor in the intelligence field and will continue to be a problem until there are no longer humans doing the jobs of the CIA and NCS. An example of human error are described in Richard Betts’, “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed”. He goes on to say “doubts of certainty between leaders of intelligence and policymakers which can cause demands for more research and cancellation of declared

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

In conclusion, this Case Report will endeavor to highlight the importance of historical lessons for Intelligence Analysts and officers in dealing with future contingency.

The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis

To conduct effective analysis, which leads to decision-making, it is important to have an understanding of cognitive biases and how they impact the analysis provided. How does our government decide if they are going to get involved in a war? A lot of information is provided and analyzed to form the intelligence they use to arrive at their final decision. The concern with this is the amount of cognitive bias involved. Most people make decisions all day long without realizing the biases they have. When it comes to things like National Security it is imperative the agencies, committees and individuals all have an understanding of their own biases. One case of National Intelligence where you can see cognitive bias play a role is with the Iraq

There many steps that could have been taken to reduce the Japanese effectiveness in carrying out the attack on Pearl Harbor, but a good first that should have been taken by intelligence practitioners and policymakers during this period was to think critically. There are various methods to apply critical thinking but this case study will only explore a few. First, we will discuss the use of the analytical method, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). The next analytic research technique explored will be the use of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). Then the case study will wrap up thinking critically by discussing the affects of mirror imaging in the Pearl Harbor scenario.

Cognitive and perceptual biases can have profound impacts on any situation we encounter, whether it is in our personal life or professional occupation. Richard Heuer, from our reading this week, expresses the relations of these biases and how they relate to our everyday by stating “the process of perception links people to their environment and is critical to accurate understanding of the world about us” (Heuer 1999, 7). From the intelligence side, analysts in particular have to fight to overcome many obstacles from the cognitive reasoning of things as well as trying not to perceive things as what they expect to perceive. The bottom line to this is all information needs to sorted through and structurally analyzed in order to overcome any cognitive or perceptual biases that can creep into forecasts or analysis products. This is extremely hard because analysts are typically “influenced by their past experience, education, cultural values, and role requirements, as well as by the

In response to an increase in overt and clandestine acts by terrorist groups, transnational ideological movements and other nations, governments around the world have moved more resources into gathering intelligence to protect its people and national interests. As a result, the contribution of Intelligence Analysts in matters of national security have increased considerably in recent years. To be effective an Intelligence Analyst is required to be adept at evaluating different types of intelligence data, liaising with other departments and organisations effectively and remaining objective in scrutinising collected information. Intelligence comes in many formats, and a good understanding of these various formats and the process by which they

The challenge to an intelligence analyst, as mentioned by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, is the lack of experimental, independent testing within a controlled environment. That does not necessarily mean that the intelligence analysis process lacks a formal process or is absent scientific methodologies. Based on Knight (2010), intelligence research identifies patterns through observation so that an analyst can develop a hypothesis to predict future events the very premise of the scientific method. However, the IC has acknowledged a scientific gap and has been migrating towards a more ?coherent scientific discipline? based on the need to improve performance of intelligence analysis (Johnston, ). Furthermore, intelligence analysts are provided with scientific methodologies at their disposal that they can use to strengthen their estimates. In the analyst?s toolkit there are a variety of techniques that can be used to strengthen processes and conform to more valid scientific methods. Heuer (1999), the author of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), use ACH as an eight-step procedure using basic insights from cognitive psychology, decision analysis, and the scientific method. According to Bruce, ACH attempts to eliminate cognitive bias and provide other explanations with possible outcomes through testing hypotheses in an attempt to refute or ?disconfirm? them (Bruce, 2008, p. 175). After all, the challenge to inductive inference is not in supporting a study?s conclusions, but refuting them through scientific means. Heuer?s ACH methodology attempts to reconcile this weakness and has become a recognized advancement towards this goal. In Bruce?s essay (2008), he acknowledges that had the 2002 Iraq NIE utilized this methodology, the estimate?s weighty findings should have exposed the

Strategic intelligence is essential in making the most appropriate decisions when it comes to defense policies. There should be proper gathering, analysis and appreciations of pertinent and factual data. In most intelligence failures, problems always starts with collection of data from the ground by professionals who then analyses

Vital to this are on-going threat assessments. Effective threat assessment is the need for abundant, timely and useable intelligence, about potential terrorist sponsors, perpetrators, activities and targets, as well as intelligence to guide our prevention and preparation activities and programs.  Despite the transnational nature of many terrorist groups, challenges to integrating foreign intelligence with domestic law enforcement information remains.

Assumptions matter for a number of reasons, according to (Field, 2013; Hayes & Cai, 2007) there are perhaps three components of importance when talking about assumptions, e.g., Parameter estates, confidence intervals, and significance tests.

I have advanced research skills, demonstrated by the body of research I have contributed to over the course of my Honours thesis and my Masters. I have developed upon existing areas of research, such as when I applied existing theories and models of strategic intelligence to a new context - that of the late Roman Empire. This required knowledge of the overall research direction of the field of strategic intelligence, as well as am understanding of existing gaps in research. I took modern conceptions of intelligence practices and models used them to explore how the late Roman Empire performed intelligence work and if there were any implications for the modern world, particularly in reference to area control and strategic security. This project expanded on and contributed to the overall direction of the field in a unique manner.

In this research, we are adopting deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is the logical process of deriving a conclusion from a known premise or something known to be true (Saunders et al., 2009). It is also informally known as “top-down” approach (Saleem, 2008). The flow chart in appendix shows a model of deductive reasoning applied in our research. (Refer Appendix Flow Chart 3.1)