26. Let the demand and cost functions of a multiplant monopolist be p = a - b(qı + q:), Ci = azq1 + Bigi, and C: = a292 + B2q3 where all parameters are positive. Assume that an autonomous increase of demand increases the value of a, leaving the other parameters unchanged. Show that output will increase in both plants with a greater increase for the plant in which marginal cost is increasing less fast.

26. Let the demand and cost functions of a multiplant monopolist be p = a - b(qı + q:), Ci = azq1 + Bigi, and C: = a292 + B2q3 where all parameters are positive. Assume that an autonomous increase of demand increases the value of a, leaving the other parameters unchanged. Show that output will increase in both plants with a greater increase for the plant in which marginal cost is increasing less fast.

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter8: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7SQP

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. Suppose a monopolist producing Q units of output faces the demand curve P = 130 − 4Q. Its total cost when producing Q units of output is T C(Q) = F + 34Q+ 2Q2 , where F is a fixed cost. (a) For what values of F can a profit-maximizing firm charging a uniform price earn at least zero economic profit? (b) For what values of F can a profit-maximizing firm engaging in perfect first-degree price discrimination earn at least zero economic profit.
5. A monopolist with cost function c(Q)=faces an inverse demand function given by P(Q)= √Q' (a) Find the elasticity of demand with respect to price. (b) Assuming that the monopolist uses MR = MC pricing rule, find his profit maximizing price, p", and output level, q". (c) Find the marginal cost at q" and calculate the Lerner index. (d) Does the monopolist's market power depend on his cost curve? In particu- lar, does it depend on a? Is your answer surprising?
Suppose a monopoly market has a demand function in whichquantity demanded depends not only on market price (P) butalso on the amount of advertising the firm does (A, measuredin dollars). The specific form of this function isQ =(20 - P2) (1 + 0.1A - 0.01A2).The monopolistic firm’s cost function is given byC = 10Q + 15 + A.a. Suppose there is no advertising (A = 0). What outputwill the profit-maximizing firm choose? What market price will this yield? What will be the monopoly’sprofits?b. Now let the firm also choose its optimal level of advertising expenditure. In this situation, what output levelwill be chosen? What price will this yield? What will thelevel of advertising be? What are the firm’s profits in thiscase? Hint: This can be worked out most easily by assuming the monopoly chooses the profit-maximizing pricerather than quantity.
2. Suppose the home country open up to free trade and a foreign competitor enters the market. Assume thatthe foreign firm has the same cost structure as the home firm (the monopoly from the previous question). The demand for its product is given by the inverse demand function: P = 120 −QD. The company’s costs are: T C = 20Q+ 200 and MC = $20A) Derive the best response function for each firm (h-home and f-foreign)B) Find each firms’ output, the home market price, and each firms’ profit from the home market3. Now, suppose that in addition to the home country opening up to free trade, the foreign country has alsoopened up to free trade. As a result, both firms sell their product in both markets.A) Find each firms’ overall output, market price in each market, and each firms’ overall profitB) Explain what effect free trade has (relative to no trade) on the firms and consumers
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Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function:P = 200 - QA - QBwhere QA and QB are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the sellingprice. Total cost functions for the two companies areTCA = 1500 + 55QA + Q2ATCB = 1200 + 20QB + 2Q2BAssume that the firms act independently as in the Cournot model (i.e., each firmassumes that the other firm’s output will not change).a. Determine the long-run equilibrium output and selling price for each firm.b. Determine Firm A, Firm B, and total industry profits at the equilibrium solutionfound in Part (a).
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4. Consider a monopolist with cost funetion c(q) = 20g, who is facing two con- sumers. The consumers' demand functions are given by 91 = 100 - p 92 = 300 – 3p. (a) Suppose the monopolist does not price discriminate. Find the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy, the resulting profit, and Lerner Index. (b) Suppose the monopolist can engage in third degree price discrimination. Find the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy and the resulting profit. Compare the profit with that found in part (a), and give an intuitive ex- planation. (c) Now, suppose the monopolist can produce the good at zero cost. That is clq) = 0. Find the monopolist's optimal second degree price discrimination strategy.