A market comprises two consumers groups: high-demand types and low-demand types. Assume there are 100 consumers of each type. The high types have demand QH= 14 - Pand low types have demand QL = 12 - P. Assume the marginal (and average) cost is 4 and there are no fixed costs. If the monopolist firm is able to distinguish between the two consumer types and using block pricing to extract maximum profit, how much profit will they earn in total? Select one: a. 9000 b. 6800 C. 8200 d. 7200

A market comprises two consumers groups: high-demand types and low-demand types. Assume there are 100 consumers of each type. The high types have demand QH= 14 - Pand low types have demand QL = 12 - P. Assume the marginal (and average) cost is 4 and there are no fixed costs. If the monopolist firm is able to distinguish between the two consumer types and using block pricing to extract maximum profit, how much profit will they earn in total? Select one: a. 9000 b. 6800 C. 8200 d. 7200

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter8: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7SQP

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