Assume that everyone's preferences among the three outcomes are fully evident as a result of the discussion. The three must proceed to a vote. Consider the following voting procedure. First A proposes an action (either promote or keep or fire). Then it is B's turn. If B accepts A's proposal, then this becomes the final decision. If B disagrees with A'a proposal, then C makes the final decision (which may be any of the three: promote, keep or fire). Represent this situation as an extensive game with perfect information. (Use utility numbers from the set {1,2,3}.)
Assume that everyone's preferences among the three outcomes are fully evident as a result of the discussion. The three must proceed to a vote. Consider the following voting procedure. First A proposes an action (either promote or keep or fire). Then it is B's turn. If B accepts A's proposal, then this becomes the final decision. If B disagrees with A'a proposal, then C makes the final decision (which may be any of the three: promote, keep or fire). Represent this situation as an extensive game with perfect information. (Use utility numbers from the set {1,2,3}.)
Chapter14: Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Information, And Behavioral Economics
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 4.9P
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