Consider two-sided, one-to-one matching between five men (A, B, C, D, and E) and five women (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). Their rankings are as follows: Men: A: 4, 1, A, 3, 2, 5 Women: 1: C, B, A, 1, D, E B: 1, 2, 4, 5, B, 3 2: E, A, B, C, D, 2 C: 3, 2, 1, 4, 5, C 3: A, B, E, D, C, 3 D: 1, 3, 5, D, 4, 2 4: B, C, D, E, 4, A E: 5, 3, 4, 2, 1, E 5: D, E, A, B, C, 5 Which of the following matchings has no blocking pairs? OA:4, B:1, C:3, D:D, E:5, 2:2 OA:A, B:5, C:3, D:2, E:1, 4:4 O A:4, B:5, C:3, D:2, E:1 OA:4, B:1, C:2, D:3, E:5 OA:2, B:3, C:5, D:1, E:4

Consider two-sided, one-to-one matching between five men (A, B, C, D, and E) and five women (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). Their rankings are as follows: Men: A: 4, 1, A, 3, 2, 5 Women: 1: C, B, A, 1, D, E B: 1, 2, 4, 5, B, 3 2: E, A, B, C, D, 2 C: 3, 2, 1, 4, 5, C 3: A, B, E, D, C, 3 D: 1, 3, 5, D, 4, 2 4: B, C, D, E, 4, A E: 5, 3, 4, 2, 1, E 5: D, E, A, B, C, 5 Which of the following matchings has no blocking pairs? OA:4, B:1, C:3, D:D, E:5, 2:2 OA:A, B:5, C:3, D:2, E:1, 4:4 O A:4, B:5, C:3, D:2, E:1 OA:4, B:1, C:2, D:3, E:5 OA:2, B:3, C:5, D:1, E:4

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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