d) Another classmate cares more about good grades: She gets 50 units of happiness for a B and 80 units of happiness for an A. If this classmate were your partner (but your preferences remained the same), how would your answers to parts (a) and (b) change? Which of the two classmates would you prefer as a partner? Would she also want you as a partner?

d) Another classmate cares more about good grades: She gets 50 units of happiness for a B and 80 units of happiness for an A. If this classmate were your partner (but your preferences remained the same), how would your answers to parts (a) and (b) change? Which of the two classmates would you prefer as a partner? Would she also want you as a partner?

Economics (MindTap Course List)

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617383

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter20: Consumer Choice: Maximizing Utility And Behavioral Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8QP

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