le discussed in class that with n agents, there are n! permutations of agents which n! different deterministic serial dictatorship mechanisms. Every serial dict. strategyproof and results in a Pareto optimal outcome (ex post). Consider m > n items to be assigned to n agents. Propose a mechanism that: 1. receives as input a full ranked list (strict ordering; no ties) of items from eac and based on this input computes an outcome, 2. is Pareto optimal (aka Pareto efficient ex post), 3. is strategyproof (no agent can benefit from misreporting),

Database System Concepts
7th Edition
ISBN:9780078022159
Author:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan
Publisher:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan
Chapter1: Introduction
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We discussed in class that with n agents, there are n! permutations of agents which results
in n! different deterministic serial dictatorship mechanisms. Every serial dictatorship
is strategyproof and results in a Pareto optimal outcome (ex post).
Consider m >n items to be assigned to n agents. Propose a mechanism that:
1. receives as input a full ranked list (strict ordering; no ties) of items from each agent,
and based on this input computes an outcome,
2. is Pareto optimal (aka Pareto efficient ex post),
3. is strategyproof (no agent can benefit from misreporting),
4. guarantees the outcome to be envy-free up to one item (EF1).
For your answer, 1) justify that your proposed mechanism satisfies each of the items
above and 2) given an example that shows the steps of your proposed mechanism.
Transcribed Image Text:We discussed in class that with n agents, there are n! permutations of agents which results in n! different deterministic serial dictatorship mechanisms. Every serial dictatorship is strategyproof and results in a Pareto optimal outcome (ex post). Consider m >n items to be assigned to n agents. Propose a mechanism that: 1. receives as input a full ranked list (strict ordering; no ties) of items from each agent, and based on this input computes an outcome, 2. is Pareto optimal (aka Pareto efficient ex post), 3. is strategyproof (no agent can benefit from misreporting), 4. guarantees the outcome to be envy-free up to one item (EF1). For your answer, 1) justify that your proposed mechanism satisfies each of the items above and 2) given an example that shows the steps of your proposed mechanism.
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