Two firms engage in Cournot competition in the Everlasting Gobstopper industry. The price elasticity of demand is -2. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $205.00 per unit, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $297.25 per unit. If the two firms are currently in equilibrium, what is firm 2's share of the market? Enter your answer as a decimal, rounded to two places if necessary. 0.59

Two firms engage in Cournot competition in the Everlasting Gobstopper industry. The price elasticity of demand is -2. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $205.00 per unit, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $297.25 per unit. If the two firms are currently in equilibrium, what is firm 2's share of the market? Enter your answer as a decimal, rounded to two places if necessary. 0.59

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11SQP

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