uppose you have an insurance plan in which you pay the market price for medical care until you meet a deductible of $1,000, after which you have a coinsurance rate of .20. Answer parts a and b assuming your inverse demand curve for medical care is P = 400 – 10Q and the market price for medical care is $200 per unit. a) Graph the price line and your demand curve. On the graph, label the values of the x and y intercepts of the demand curve, the quantity where you meet the deductible, the horizontal sections of the price line, and the point(s) where the demand curve intersects the price line. b) Find the number of units of medical care that you will demand. Show all calculations that you performed in your analysis.

uppose you have an insurance plan in which you pay the market price for medical care until you meet a deductible of $1,000, after which you have a coinsurance rate of .20. Answer parts a and b assuming your inverse demand curve for medical care is P = 400 – 10Q and the market price for medical care is $200 per unit. a) Graph the price line and your demand curve. On the graph, label the values of the x and y intercepts of the demand curve, the quantity where you meet the deductible, the horizontal sections of the price line, and the point(s) where the demand curve intersects the price line. b) Find the number of units of medical care that you will demand. Show all calculations that you performed in your analysis.

Microeconomics A Contemporary Intro

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285635101

Author:MCEACHERN

Publisher:MCEACHERN

Chapter4: Demand, Supply, And Markets

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6QFR

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Consider a market for health insurance similar to the one below. Image attached Suppose individuals have different health levels H, where H is distributed uniformly between 0 and 9. The marginal cost of medical care depends on an individual’s health H, and is characterized by the function MC=1000+1000*H (notice that a higher value of H corresponds to a sicker person, with higher marginal costs, so the left edge of the graph corresponds to the sickest person with H=9, and the right edge of the graph corresponds to the healthiest person with H=0). Individuals are risk averse, there is a single insurance plan available for purchase (as in the Akerlof model, NOT the R-S model), and individuals have utility functions for this insurance plan that result in a risk premium equal to RP=1000*H. Now suppose an individual insurance mandate is imposed that forces all consumers to purchase insurance or else pay a tax of $3000. a) What will the insurance mandate do to the equilibrium price of…
Show how a consumer would choose between medical care and health(y) behavior activities using the graphical representation of the consumer choice model (assume that “amounts” of healthy behavior have “costs” or prices).
Assume a consumer's demand for a medical service is as follows: Q = 100 - Pp where Pp is the out-of-pocket price she actually faces. She is considering four different insurance options: uninsurance, full insurance, a 50% coinsurance plan, and a copayment plan with a $25 copay. Assume this service has a list price of PL = $70. Calculate Q under each insurance plan. Please fill in the final answer without showing the middle steps (a number only, without any extra space, symbol, word, etc.) If the customer is uninsured, Q= • If the customer is fully insured, Q= • If the customer has a 50% coinsurance plan, Q= • If the customer has the copayment plan, Q=
1. An individual has a health insurance plan with a deductible of $1200 and a coinsurance rate of 50%. Their demand curve is Q=20-(P/10), and the equilibrium market price of medical care is $100 per unit. What quantity of medical care would the individual choose to consume? 2. Suppose that consumers are all risk neutral and so they do not purchase health insurance. The equilibrium price of a doctor visit is $30, the supply of doctor visits is perfectly elastic, and the aggregate demand for doctor visits is given by Q=200-5*P. Calculate the effect that universal perfect health insurance (that is, coinsurance rate=0) would have on social welfare, measured as the sum of consumer surplus plus producer surplus. 3. Consider a version of the Akerlof model in which neither buyers nor sellers observe car quality (though somehow – please suspend your disbelief – both buyers and sellers enjoy higher utility from higher quality cars). For this question, please assume that both buyers…
Use the black point (plus symbol) to indicate the quantity of procedures ded if each procedure has a price of $100. Then use the grey point Consider how health insurance affects the quantity of health care services performed. Suppose that the typical medical procedure has a cost of $100, yet a person with health insurance pays only $20 out of pocket. Her insurance company pays the remaining $80. (The insurance company recoups the $80 through premiums, but the premium a person pays does not depend on how many procedures that person chooses to undergo.) (star symbol) to indicate the quantity of procedures demanded if each procedure has a price of 520. 200 180 Q at P-$100 160 140 120 Q, at P=$20 100 20 60 40 Demand 30 40 50 80 70 801 90 100 Quantity of Medical Procedures 20 10 20 Price of Medical Procedures
Show how a consumer would choose between medical care and health(y) behavior activities using the graphical representation of the consumer choice model (assume that “amounts” of healthy behavior have “costs” or prices). How might health education affect this choice? What if medical care becomes more productive (more health benefit per “unit” of medical care consumed)? What if medical care becomes cheaper? Explain in terms of the model (i.e. what does it change in the model).
Economics Use the following information to determine the costs to you and/or to the insurance company for the following occurrences:1) You have $500 per person Wellness Benefit.2) You have a $500 İndividual Deductible and your family (spouse and children) has a $500 Family Deductible.3) You have a $10,000 annual Maximum Family Out-of- Pocket expense provision.4) Once you have met your Individual or Family Deductible, your insurance will pay 80% of the expenses and you will pay 20% as your co-pay.Unless the occurrence is a Wellness expense, you and/or your family have to meet their deductibles first before insurance will pay anything. Example:Assume that you have met your deductible, and you go to the Emergency Room for a large cut on your shin which required cleaning, 20 stitches, a tetanus shot, and antibiotics. (80/20 plan)Total Charges = $2,500 totalYour Responsibility = $2,500*.20 = $500 (goes toward your Max Out of Pocket)Insurance Responsibility = $2,500*.80 = $2,000 Question:…
Suppose that a study finds that the price elasticity of demand for MRI's is 0.3 (in absolute value). If the price of care were to ___ by 3%, we would expect the quantity of preventative care consumed to fall by ____%. Suppose that a study finds that the price elasticity of demand for MRI's is 0.3 (in absolute value). If the price of care were to ___ by 3%, we would expect the quantity of preventative care consumed to fall by ____%. a. fall; 0.3% b. rise; 0.9% c. rise; 0.3% d. fall; 0.9%
Draw a market where consumers demand health insurance and insurance companies supply insurance at a price of insurance called the premium. Explain why, in this model of the insurance market, the individual mandate (the mandate is everyone has to have insurance) will cause health insurance premiums to increase.
Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion Suppose that a consumer’s demand curve for medical care is QD = −3P +17 with P = $5. Suppose that the beneficiary obtains an insurance plan through an insurer with a 25% coinsurance rate. Under the insurance arrangement, find the following: (a) Equilibrium price and quantity of medical care? (b) Magnitude of deadweight loss? (c) Cost to the beneficiary? (d) Cost to the insurer?
In a commentary piece on the rising cost of health insurance, ("Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise," Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2004, A20), economists John Cogan, Glenn Hubbard, and Daniel Kessler state, "Each percentage-point rise in health-insurance costs increases the number of uninsured by 300,000 people." Assuming that their claim is correct, demonstrate that the price elasticity of demand for health insurance depends on the number of people who are insured. What is the price elasticity if 192 million people are insured? If 192 million people are insured, then the price elasticity of demand for health insurance is (Enter a numeric response using a real number rounded to three decimal places. Be sure to include the minus sign.) What is the price elasticity if 247 million people are insured? (Enter a numeric If 247 million people are insured, then the price elasticity of demand for health insurance is response using a real number rounded to three decimal places. Be sure to include the…
An individual has the following utility function: U = Z!/2 H/2, where Z is a composite good and H is the level of health. The individual has income, m = $100. The price of the composite good, Z, is Pz = 1. The price of health, H, is PH = 4. What is the optimal consumption bundle of H and Z that maximizes utility? Show your steps and show the decision graphically (which includes finding the endpoints of the budget constraint).