1. The 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (Aspg) Describes

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

Partnerships were not just joint but a better relationship between the Operational units under INSCOM and the proponent for intelligence under Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). These formed a strong bond that allowed current education, training, and mission success to shape the Army’s next steps. The relationship between TRADOC and the Operational frontend is absolutely vital to the success of training and education. Too often TRADOC would lag behind or operations would not communicate the changing demands, thus hindering the advance of military intelligence occupational

The Army accomplishes this mission by executing Title 10 and Title 32 United States Code directives, to include organizing, equipping, and training forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land. In doing so, the Army accomplishes missions assigned by the President, Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders, and transforming the future. The planning function of management ensures the mission is always the objective along with orders from the Commander In Chief.

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

Moving forward, our Army's primary purpose is steadfast and resolute: to fight and win our Nation's wars. But we all know that the Army must be able to do much more than that. Today, we require an Army that is adaptive and innovative, flexible and agile, integrated and synchronized, lethal and discriminate. Even more critical in today's complex and uncertain environment, the Army is the decisive arm of the Joint Force in a broad range of missions. Historically the Army has been focused on a specific set of needs, but these needs and the means in which they are resourced have changed. So we must fundamentally change how we do business. As we keep adding rocks to our Soldiers' rucksacks, all leaders must remain cognizant over time. Everyone's load can get too heavy and cause permanent wear and tear. So it is a good idea to

In addition to Talisman Sabre 2013, I Corps developed and tested Pacific Pathways, which is a model similar to the Marines’ UDP. I Corps will deploy a HQs, tactical force, with an aviation detachment and enablers will deploy to the USPACOM AOR to participate in exercises and to respond to a contingency. Therefore, the regional alignment of I Corps, represents an opportunity to scale

Military planning and operations in the 21st century must take into consideration a number of different issues. One of the ways in which the late 20th century evolved was the change in economic, political, and cultural movements that, through technology, seemed to move countries of the world closer together.

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

a. The United States Army faces many challenges since the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century. Many of these challenges are due to long, repeated deployments in different countries where the struggle of stability operations is ongoing. Army Doctrine has been adjusting doctrinal terms and operational priorities, as the result of strategies used overtime to accurately achieve dominance in the battlefield.

Army officers learn from the onset of their careers the important role they play as problem solvers. The various military institutions tasked with providing education to the officer corps spend vast amounts of time teaching and reinforcing the Army Problem Solving Process. With that being said, Army officers at all ranks would be better served if they were able to incorporate the eight elements of thought as defined by Drs. Paul & Elder into the military decision-making process. Although encompassed within the Army problem solving process, officers often fail to identify and incorporate the tenets of thought when making decisions resulting in potentially adverse consequences. The following examples will highlight

Normally, before any new equipment can be purchased, the need must be proven and prioritized (MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform, 20). The Pentagon uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to determine requirements and only select projects are important enough to be considered by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the others are passed down to lower levels (Ibid.). JROC and JCIDS assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff counsel the Secretary of Defense on the military capabilities (Ibid.). The process of determining requirements is laborious due to the number of compromises and concerns that need to be considered before making a decision to spend billions of dollars. Key issues for consideration include the importance of the requirement to mission success and determining the best resources required to satisfy the need (Ibid.). Other considerations include impacts to training, tactics, doctrine, organizations, leader development, personnel, and facilities (Ibid.). The requirements process is purposely designed to be strenuous since its goal is to decrease waste and take full advantage of benefits (Ibid.). The main point is that is not possible to acquire military equipment without a validated requirement or without considering if other less costly solutions might address the problem. Although the normal acquisition process focuses primarily on future requirements, it does permit a review of urgent needs from field commanders (Ibid.). Finally, the normal acquisition process requires a sequential phasing process characterized by developmental testing, operational testing, production, integration, fielding, disposal and requirements refining (Dikici,

The Army’s mission is to build forces capable of Unified Land Operations, able to operate effectively with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners across the range of military operations to provide capable and ready forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) in support of the National Security and National Defense Strategies, while sustaining and maintaining the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. (United States, 2014)

The Army emphasis during Phase 1 is to analyze the capability gap from their DOTMLPF perspectives and to further refine concep

Thus, related to above “force development” approach, and current status analysis, the critical missing “capabilities gap” is in the command and control (C2) and intelligence dominions. C2 and an appropriate command structure to provide the unity of effort and unified action from respective stakeholder

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)