F103 Total Army Analysis TAA and Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution PPBE Notes

Military leaders make decisions and solve problems every day. Some need a decision quickly while others can take time. The US Army has several decision-making methods to assist leaders. The Army Problem Solving Model (Process) (PSM) is a systematic approach to identifying the best possible solution to an issue or problem and a deliberate method of decision-making (FM 6-0, 2009). Leaders use it to solve a problem when time is not critical and they can put some thought into different solutions. The solution must be objective and based on facts in order for the decision to be relevant and practical. The

Concepts lead change for the Army and drive the development and integration of future capabilities. More specifically, they provide a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. In addition, concepts serve as a foundation to help the Army maximize effectiveness and minimize risk through both materiel and nonmaterial capabilities. The role of concepts is to describe how future forces will operate. Concepts assists in the identification of prioritized capability gaps and integrated Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

In General Odierno’s 2014 AUSA Winter Symposium speech, he discussed several changes the U.S. Army will face in the future. He informed his audience the reduction within the Army’s force structure, which will continue until FY 2017. Determine organizational authorizations of the force development process best illustrates what General Odierno deliberated in his speech.

The Department of Defense (DOD) must decide how to rebalance the armed forces general force structure to meet future challenges and opportunities in an austere fiscal environment. The general force structure and capabilities of Joint Force 2020 necessary to adjust the force based on current strategic direction and fiscal constraints is a smaller, efficient, adaptable and integrated joint force. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes US military forces will evolve and remain modern, capable, and ready while accepting some increased risk through force reductions. Rebalancing will require innovative approaches and solutions to protect the homeland, build global security, project power, and win decisively with a leaner force.

After reviewing The AOC, TP 525-3-1, which describes how the United States Army will employ forces and capabilities in complex

The National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) directives define the U.S. objectives. In the NSS, the Executive Branch underscored that departments provide assistance and obtain cooperation with the U.S foreign allies. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense NDS directed the Department of

In FY13 the Army will transition as we reduce the size of the assigned personnel and force structure. The initial stage of drawdown for Active Component Operational Support is expected to end by FY15 and begins to eliminate the wartime allowance completed by FY17 affecting the ability formations. The Army has enough Soldiers to fill authorization aggregate, but still has shortages in Rank and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). We need to assign personnel that are available to determine manning effectiveness as well as readiness in deploying units. Synchronizes and integrates readiness priorities for the war fighter and our Army including all forces. The Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and the Army priorities are already established

Most military members agree that being a leader means being “in charge” regardless of the situation. While this axiom may hold true during the joint operation phases of “Seize the Initiative” or “Dominate”, it is not the case for steady state operations with the IA. This axiom has become a caricature of the DoD mindset in the minds of many civilian leaders. If military service members are to become more effective with IA coordination, they must understand and appreciate three dynamics to steady state operations. First, the value that our partners bring to the fight . Second, that in the steady state, DoD is not the lead agency. Third, with the overabundant emphasis of the topic in joint doctrine, most leaders

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

CPT Nobles was the lead planner representing one of 48 concepts and capabilities examined during the Army Warfighting Assessment (AWA) 17.1 at Ft. Bliss, TX. Ben synchronized the efforts of a 15 man team from four different organizations across all Army components. He took 10 analytical observations from the tactical level exercise and developed recommendations including potential solutions to improve warfighting capability at the tactical and operational level echelons.

Managed and supervised the operational tasking, contingency planning, deployment, training and mentorship of 31 contractors and military personnel during MRXs and MTT events. Responsible for the care, training and welfare of subordinates and training audience Soldier during rotational unit exercises. Developed learning objectives, defined tasks, conditions, and standards, and produced POIs and training support packages (TSPs). Trained Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) staffs on issues supporting current and future threats, improvised explosive device (IED) pattern analysis, assets capabilities and management during home station training. Applied knowledge in the areas of SIGINT, MASINT, CI/HUMINT, and Operations Intelligence (OSINT), and the exploitation processes. Performed short- and long-range planning for upcoming rotations and Leader Training Program sessions. Developed and established a program to train newly hired DoD, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts that addressed MI Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) trends. Incorporated institutional doctrine, CTC training and tactical trends/challenges into exercise planning and rotational interjects. Routinely coordinated and conducted liaisons with Center for Lessons Learned

The discussion paper from lesson F 101 RA is an above average paper. The paper clearly discusses and answers the question of what force management is and how force management is used to prepare and win the nation’s wars. The paper further discusses in-depth how one will use force management on a daily basis at the battalion and brigade level and what force management issues consist of and look like.

There is a cascade of departments influential informing planning. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) flows from the National Security Strategy and informs the National Military Strategy and provides the foundation for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR focuses DODs strategies and capabilities and focuses on operations of today and tomorrow. The NDS provides the framework for DOD strategic guidance, deliberate planning, force development and intelligence.16 Ch II 11-3 Strategic Direction and Joint operations.

Diminishing resources and lack of predictability within the military budget process will introduce significant strategic, military and political risk. Joint Forces capability, capacity and readiness requirements are derived from the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and provide the framework for Joint Force future strategy. Sequestration has severely impacted the Joint Forces ability to plan and program resources necessary to achieve these strategic objectives. Sequestration requires the DOD to execute across the board cuts from all accounts and has limited the department’s ability to move resources to accounts with greater needs. This has not only impacted readiness and force structure, but has also reduced investment in new weapon systems. Research and development is necessary in order to field new technologies that will enable the Joint Force to keep ahead of