CPT Nobles Case Study

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

During the latter part of FY16 and the beginning of FY17, the EEOCA cadre successfully conducted three Institutional Army Warfighter Assessments (IAWAs) designed to test the validity of the proposed curriculum. Substantive changes were instituted throughout the IAWA process and the finished version of POI 16.0 is pending approval and validation. Since the IAWA process, there has been a graduate rate of 64% and a total of 270 Soldiers will be trained during FY17. The desired outcome is a course that better meets the needs of all components, reduces resources, and trains the critical tasks to

The National Defense University’s, Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, provides a critical analysis from a strategic perspective on the wars in Iraq in Afghanistan. The study concluded that, “Neither national-level leaders nor field commanders fully understood the operational environment.” Indeed, Secretary Robert Gates stated, “our prospects in both countries were grimmer than perceived; our initial objectives were unrealistic… [and] our knowledge and our intelligence were woefully inadequate. We entered both countries oblivious to how little we knew.” Worse, the study identified that after fifteen years of war senior leaders remained unable to identify what or who the enemy is. Recognizing this deficiency as well as the trends in the operating environment, the United States Army and Marine Corps began a multi-year effort in 2005 to develop methods for commanders and staffs to understand complex problems and visualize solutions to solving them. The result was the Army Design Methodology (ADM), which prepares the military for future wars in a complex environment by bridging art and science in an iterative process that facilitates learning, anticipation, and adaptation. The discussion begins with a brief over view of the operating environment before turning to ADM’s utility in preparing for future wars and addressing two of its criticisms.

In a speech at George Washington University in November of 2015, the United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter also addressed challenges facing the United States, stating that the security of the US depends on a force better than it is today. This force not only includes the military services, but also extends to the civilian workforce of the combat support agencies, upon which this paper focuses. The vision of the future force is one that can quickly adapt and achieve success in a sophisticated, highly-technical and rapidly changing environment; maximize the benefits of commercial technology development; and address global military competition to defend the nation and make the world a better place.

- Petty Officer Williams acted as a Command Readiness Training Team member. He assessed 25 drills and exercises, provided training to five watch section personnel increasing the command efficiency and readiness for the upcoming ULTRA-S assessment. His training and expertise ensured that NCTS Far East successfully passed ULTRA-S certification with a 95.7 percent, the highest score assessed throughout the NAVIFOR domain.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

As a part of the FY17 Future Warfare Study Framework, the HD Concept is revised to provide relevant operational context in order to better identify first-order human performance requirements for Soldier and Team overmatch. This context would help refine the nature and characteristics of future warfare and inform not only our thinking about “How the Army Fights,” but equally important “How Humans

The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the U.S. military campaign planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2002 to 2007 using the Joint Planning Publication 5-0 Joint Operational Planning as a framework. The overall proposal of this document is that it was the miscalculations associated with the understanding of the operational environment and specific elements of operational design that led to the major planning failures. This paper also covers how the reframing process, also known as “the surge”, led to significant changes to the operational approach. This essay begins with a discussion of the initial planning and execution of OIF, including a description of how well military leaders understood the operational environment

This essay will explain the ways a staff NCO can anticipate the outcome of current operations to develop concepts for follow-on missions. It is critical in today’s Army that the staff NCO is able to effectively brief his or her commander on potential courses of action for current operations. Before a staff NCO is able to create courses of action against a potential threat, he or she must be able to anticipate the results on the battlefield. To win wars, commanders must be comprehensively informed and make decisions quickly. The commander relies on staff officers and NCOs to assist with the planning and developing of courses of action in regards to making these decisions.

CPT William's duty performance was satisfactory during this rating period. He successfully monitored, executed and closed 25 FLIPLs

3. Due to the high turn-over of field grade officers this summer, Captain Bruce is the officer who is available and has the need and desire to complete this seminar. Although he is not selected to Major, he has the knowledge, background, and the drive to do extremely well. Captain Bruce has a lot to offer in his capacity as a Defense Systems Analyst

You did an excellent job answering this week’s discussion board question. The Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is an excellent way to deter criminal activities. The triangle that you attached to your post helps to demonstrated the overall concept of CPTED. The as the number of possible targets and opportunities to commit criminal activities increase, the more criminal activities will be committed. However, If you enhance a location using CPTED you decrease the number of possible targets and opportunities to commit criminal activities, in turn decreases the overall number of number of crimes that will be committed. You focused on cities using CPTED to enhance neighborhoods to decrease the overall level of crimes.

The art and science of warfighting is an amazingly broad and deep subject with complexities that bridge the technical aspects of war and the social interactions that win them. Whether we discuss tactical intricacies of the battlefield or bureaucratic complexities at the Pentagon, multi-faceted problem sets bombard our branch. The government directed Budget Control Act of 2011 in concert with sequestration, the Holistic Aviation Assessment Task Force, the Aviation Restructure Initiative, and a significant operational transition from counterinsurgency to decisive action are just some of the complex, ill-structured, or so-called "wicked problems" that exist. The second and third order effects of these programs and the consequences of decisions

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of