Goldman Sachs Case Summary

We also know that Louis was contemplating a possible IPO exit strategy before the end of the holding period term. To estimate a multiple for this IPO exit, we need to look at the Price/Earnings ratio for Dollarama. Using the same methodology as above, we compared Dollarama to the same group of companies and computed the average P/E ratio for the set, see Exhibit 6a. We will consider the values for the year 2005 and will take a multiple of 24.6 for an eventual IPO exit.

Finally, in order to complete a more accurate comparison between the two projects, we utilized the EANPV as the deciding factor. Under current accepted financial practice, NPV is generally considered the most accurate method of predicting the performance of a potential project. The duration of the projects is different, one lasts four years and one lasts six years. To account for the variation in time frames for the projects and to further refine our selection we calculated the EANPV to compare performance on a yearly basis.

Further, even in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era, the cost of an IPO, and the subsequent filing documents required by the SEC, is significant. I estimate the cost of the IPO to be $1 million in 1992, and $500,000 each year after for the filing requirements (or the cost of being public). These amounts are subtracted from the free cash flows in the appropriate years.

As a member of management Clive Jenkins is responsible for boosting employee morale to ensure that company goals are met

The share price of $270,000 was significantly higher because the “fair value” as perceived by the dissenters, which accounted for the chance of an IPO. Taking into account the recently traded Kohler Co. share prices, the book value of a share, and the possibility of an IPO greatly inflated what the perceived value of each share should be. While Kohler believed their voting control and ownership structure would remain the same, the shareholders believed otherwise. Because shareholders assumed Kohler would go public, they argued for a higher valuation so as to receive the highest price, and thus profit, in the buyout.  So based on the highest MVE, we picked Masco as the comparable firm of choice. Using Masco’s MVE, $9838.8, and LTM EBIAT, $437.3, we solved for Masco’s P/E ratio, which was equal to 22.5. By multiplying the P/E ratio by Kohler’s LTM EBIAT (22.5 * $93.76), we projected a market value of $2,109,610,000.  To solve for estimated share price, we divided the projected market value by 7,587.89, the number of shares outstanding to obtain an estimated share price of $278,023.47. This estimate is near the $270,000 per share offer price.

4) Do you think the total market value of Redhook, Pete’s and Boston Beer (at your proposed IPO price) makes sense, given the total size and profitability of the beer industry, and the craft-brewing segment? What profitability and growth assumptions are necessary to justify the total market value of these three craft brewers? (Hint: First determine the total market value of these three companies. Then figure out what the average after tax operating profit margin is for these three companies. Figure out what the value of these three companies would be if their after tax earnings continued forever, but did not grow at all. Then take the difference between their total Market Value and this (no growth) perpetuity value. This difference reflects the market value due to GROWTH. Try to figure out what growth rate in revenues is implied here by projecting total revenues for 10 years, and finding the after tax earnings for 10 years, and then discounting the after tax earnings at the cost of equity. Don't forget to calculate the terminal value (grow earnings at 4% after year 10.)

4) Do you think the total market value of Redhook, Pete’s and Boston Beer (at your proposed IPO price) makes sense, given the total size and profitability of the beer industry, and the craft-brewing segment? What profitability and growth assumptions are necessary to justify the total market value of these three craft brewers? (Hint: First determine the total market value of these three companies. Then figure out what the average after tax operating profit margin is for these three companies. Figure out what the value of these three companies would be if their after tax earnings continued forever, but did not grow at all. Then take the difference between their total Market Value and this (no growth) perpetuity value. This difference reflects the market value due to GROWTH. Try to figure out what growth rate in revenues is implied here by projecting total revenues for 10 years, and finding the after tax earnings for 10 years, and then discounting the after tax earnings at the cost of equity. Don't forget to calculate the terminal value (grow earnings at 4% after year 10.)

in our calculations, as this company exhibited dramatic value differences to others in the sample, (likely to skew our results and prove misleading). Using the average of the revised sample field for each ratio, we inserted Torrington’s values where appropriate to generate an entity value. The findings generated two values for Torrington, 606 million and 398 million. Taking the average of these two numbers, Torrington exhibited a relative value of 502.41 million. Because of the lack of related information given in the case, and the often large differences in measures amongst competitors, different capital structures, internal management strategies, there remained many unknowns in our model. We decided it would be best to use this valuation to reaffirm our assumptions in our DCF valuation. (Please see exhibits)

In a first step we have to postulate when the successful exit is going to happen. Normally this period is assumed to be between 3 and 7 years long. In our case, we make the assumption that a successful exit is going to happen in 1999. Since we are only concerned about the successful scenario, we go along with the projection of AccessLine, which is probably overoptimistic, and use its expected revenue of 208M at the time the exit happens. After the IPO, we presume the company will grow at a high rate for the next five years in the 75 percentile as proposed by Metrick, Andrew and Ayako Yasuda in their “Venture Capital and the Finance of innovation” book. We chose five years since the typical firm reaches maturity within five years after the IPO. Besides, we assume a tax rate of 30.64% given by the industry average (Damodaran 2013). As a discount rate, we use simply the industry average. Alternatively, we could use the Betas of the comparable companies. This gives us an unlevered average beta of 0.5*(1.39+2.03) since both companies are completely equity financed. The risk free rate was given by 7.1%, if we assume a risk premium of 5.79% (Damodaran for 1.4.13) we get a cost of capital of 16.9% using the CAPM equation. Because we only have two comparable companies we opt to do our calculations with the industry wide average discount rate. The operating margin at the exit date is estimated in a way that we reach a Net

Fiscal policy: Given the breadth and depth of this recession, it was clear that the Treasury and the entire Obama administration had to take bold actions. In fact, right at the beginning, they were committed to a fiscal stimulus policy package which would be “substantial” enough to pull the economy out of the recession. The final stimulus package signed into law in 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, was totaled $787 billion including about one-third tax cuts and one-third aid for states and the unemployed. Of the rest, labor health and education investment got 8%, and infrastructure investment got about 7%. It also included a large amount of government money to

Exhibit 4 tells us that the stock price of Interco started going up in July from about $44 to $72 on the day of the Board meeting. This tells us that markets anticipated that Inteco is a target for acquisition and increased the stock price of Interco in anticipation of an acquisition premium.

The Cost of debt is determined by using the average of YTM of the 4 JetBlue debt instruments provided in Exhibit 4. The exact value is 6.91%, and a CAPM cost of equity is determined to be 10.50% using the risk-free rate, market risk premium and comparable beta from Southwest of 1.10. The cost of capital is determined to be 6.90%. Running the DCF analysis, JetBlue is currently valued at $2.7bn. Distributing equity value over the shares outstanding gives a share price of $66.51. This proposed price of the IPO is highly overpriced, considering that the underwriters have priced it within a range of $22-$24.

1. The Enron debacle created what one public official reported was a “crisis of confidence” on the part of the public in the accounting profession. List the parties who you believe are most responsible for that crisis. Briefly justify each of your choices.

Hiding or divulging information: Goldman bet against their clients several times. They knew material information on certain investment; however, they never communicated that to their clients because they were making money off them.

The above formula isolates free cash flows to the firm from earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). It can be noted that FCFF are after tax (1-T) but prior to interest expense. This initial overstatement of due tax is by design; the tax deductibility of interest payments will be accounted for when incorporating the after-tax cost of debt in the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) to determine the present value of free cash flows.