Overview of the Case: The Securities and Exchange Commission claims Mark D. Begelman misused proprietary information regarding the merger of Bluegreen Corporation with BFC Financial Corporation. Mr. Begelman allegedly learned of the acquisition through a network of professional connections known as the World Presidents’ Organization (Maglich). Members of this organization freely share non-public business information with other members in confidence; however, Mr. Begelman allegedly did not abide by the organization’s mandate of secrecy and leveraged private information into a lucrative security transaction. As stated in the summary of the case by the SEC, “Mark D. Begelman, a member of the World Presidents’ Organization (“WPO”), abused …show more content…
Analysis: The facts of the case are circumstantial yet lay out a pattern of wrongdoing by the defendant. Specifically that Begelman willfully used non-public information to his financial advantage. The following timeline is indeed suspicious but no “smoking gun” or direct evidence of wrongdoing. 1. Begelman attends a conference with the WPO. 2. The WPO includes members privy to non-public information surrounding the merger. 3. Begelman maintains a close relationship with said members. 4. Days before the merger is made public, Begelman initiates a trade for 25K shares of Bluegreen stock 5. Begelman holds the stock for 15 days. 6. Begelman sells his position in Bluegreen the day the merger is announced for a $14K realized gain. How strong is the case? It is not definitive given the information available but in reality the truth does not matter. Mounting a defense against the SEC makes little sense for Begelman. Being a civil case, criminal charges are not a consideration. The state is seeking a civil penalty and a repayment of the gains (Securities and Exchange Commission). If Begelman surrenders his profits and pays a penalty of $15K he is able to avoid any admission of wrongdoing (Gehrke-White). Thus, it is pragmatic and financially beneficial (avoid prolonged legal fees) for Begelman to settle and move on regardless of his actual guilt or innocence. The only winner in the case is the State. The SEC effectively extorts $30K from the defendant by
The Court found that Cuban had not “misappropriated” any material non-public information because he had not violated a “legal duty to refrain from trading. Cuban had not promised that he would not trade after learning about a PIPE offering. The judge also said that the SEC failed to show that Cuban undertook a legal duty to not use the information he learned from those two phone calls with Mamma.com representatives. Mark Cuban did not have any fiduciary duty to not act upon the information. The Mamma.com CEO asked Cuban to keep their conversation confidential. However, that didn’t prove that Cuban had a legal duty to Mamma.com that would prohibit him from selling his shares based on what he was told. He just promised to not disclose the information to the others, not promised to not act upon what someone told him.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio rendered an Order for Final Judgment against John R. Bullar and a Consent Order against his company, Executive Management Advisors L.L.C., requiring that restitution be paid by Bullar and Executive Management Advisors, L.L.C. in excess of $6.2 million. Additionally, Bullar and Executive Management Advisors L.L.C. are required to pay civil monetary penalties in excess of $24.8 million for fraud, misappropriation, embezzlement, and operation of a Ponzi scheme. They were illegally posing as Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) and Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) but had not registered with the CFTC. Permanent trading and registration bans were also imposed prohibiting them from committing
The original complaint charges American International Group, Inc. (AIG) and certain of its officers and directors with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants disseminated false and misleading financial statements to the investing public. The true facts, which were known by each of the defendants but concealed from the investing public during the Class Period, were as follows: (a) that the Company was paying illegal and concealed "contingent commissions" pursuant to illegal "contingent commission agreements;" (b) that by concealing these "contingent commissions" and such "contingent commission agreements" the defendants violated applicable principles of fiduciary
In March 2004 the SEC filed civil lawsuits against Preston D. Hopper, and Tamela C. Pallas, for fraud and other securities law violations. The complaint alleges that Pallas orchestrated the sham transactions to simulate robust operations within CMS's marketing and trading subsidiary. Hopper failed to ensure the disclosure of the true nature of the trades. Hopper sponsored improper accounting for the sham transactions and that, when CMS's outside auditors forced CMS to reverse the reporting of the round-trip trade revenue, Hopper fraudulently failed to disclose the reasons for the reversal. The Commission is seeking in its civil suit that there be monetary penalties and that the court prevent them from serving as officers or directors of any public company.
Facts: Recently Regis Philman inherited a large investment portfolio from his grandfather. Sam Waterson, Regis’s stockbroker, has been orally instructed to always sell stock with the highest cost basis first. Regis’s stock portfolio contains 15,000 shares of Rippa Corp. Stock. This stock has been acquired over the course of a three-year period. In October of 2014, Sam was asked to sell 6,000 shares of Rippa Corp. Stock.
Looking at the case 41.9 there was a violation in sections 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This violation was done by R. Foster Winans in which he committed some insider trading where he agree to provide Felis and Brand with information that was to appear in the “head” which is a widely read and influential column. This information was to be provided by Winans to the brokers the day before it appeared in the Journal. Now taking that into account this is a serious violation of insider trading which is the illegal practice of trading on the stock exchange to one’s own advantage through having access to confidential. The classical theory of insider trading is the theory I believe should be used for the prosecution of this case.
Enclosed to this memo is the report you requested, titled The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violation at The Bank of New York Mellon. The report presents our research result on The Bank of New York Mellon’s (BNY Mellon) violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), including the backdrop of the unlawful event and its repercussion. We end the report with recommendations for future investors.
Evan Greenberg sold 81,032 shares on 09/18/15. The shares were sold at $99.92 per share for a total value of $8,096,717. The second transaction on the same day, he sold 2,620 shares at $101.34 per share. John Lupica, Vice Chairman & Chairman, Insurance - North America, has made six transactions during 6-months period. He sold his shares and also has buy and sell options transaction. On 10/21/15, he sold the total of 19,998 shares at the price approximately $112 or $113. However, he bought 8,017 shares at $56.40 by using option buy and sold 3,439 shares at sell option. By using these option, John has increased his value of $73,938. During the last 6-months period, ACE’s share price has remained stable.
“This transaction represents continued interest from institutional investors in high-quality assets in the Washington, DC market, and is consistent with our strategy to bring in well capitalized partners, deleverage our balance sheet, and position JBG Smith for future growth opportunities within our portfolio,” JBG Smith CEO Matt Kelly said in a statement.
SEC alleges that in July 2010, Leon G. Cooperman made “illegal profits” of approximately $4.1 million by buying Atlas Pipeline Partners, L.P. (APL) stock, based on material nonpublic information, ahead of the sale of one of its operations.
Table I Insider Trading Activity in Campbell Taggart from June 30 to August 2, 1982 The columns of the table give the date, the closing price of Campbell Taggart on the NYSE, the total daily trading volume of Campbell Taggart (in thousands of shares), the number of insider trades, the number of insiders who traded, and the total volume of shares purchased by insiders (in thousands), respectively. In all, the insiders bought shares in Campbell Taggart in 124 transactions, acquiring a total 265,600 shares over 23 trading days.
in 2003, investigators found that HealthSouth management had overstated earnings by at least $2.7 billion over a 17-year period. Furthermore, before the scheme was exposed, members of senior management had been quietly selling their shares as quickly as they dared and falsely reporting that HealthSouth had billions of dollars in existing assets. In August 2002, the then CEO and Chairman Richard Scrushy sold $75 million worth of his company shares just weeks ahead of HealthSouth announcing that cuts in Medicare reimbursements would reduce its pre-tax profits by $175 million. The company also said it wouldn’t issue earnings guidance for the remainder of 2002. HealthSouth’s share value immediately tumbled from $11.97 to $6.71 (HealthSouth 2002, Appendix 1). With top-tiers selling their shares and the resultant rapid and precipitous drop in the company’s share value, attracted the SEC’s attention to investigate these occurrences. The company’s insiders told SEC that the Medicare payment reduction actually was $20 million at most, and that management was using the additional $155 million in supposed reimbursement cuts to make up for reported earnings that never existed (HealthSouth 2002, Appendix 1)
1. Why might Bollenbach have opened his bidding for ITT at $55 per share? What was his likely strategy?
This led John F. “Jack” Welch Jr., GE’s chair and CEO, to call Michael Bonsignore, chair and CEO of Honeywell, to present a bid maintaining a 1:1 share for share exchange ratio. GE won the bid against UTC and agreed to a price of 1.055 GE shares for every share of Honeywell’s, plus assumed debt. The regulatory filings were
Baosteel and Posco : Each company agreedto invest US125 million to acquire a stake in the other, with this stake being less than 0,5 %