Rubino V. Circuit Court Case Study

(1) Whether a plaintiff must plead and prove willful and wanton conduct in order to

(1) Whether a plaintiff must plead and prove willful and wanton conduct in order to

Parties to the Case, Facts of the Case, and Business Reasons for the Dispute (30 points)

Because the Contractor Defendants either could not be located or have ceased doing business, plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims against those defendants with prejudice.   Accordingly, plaintiffs now seek damages only from the Liberty Defendants.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the Defendants was the agent and employee of each of the remaining Defendants and was at all times acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment.

Lastly, John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint, connecting their case to that of Roe’s. They were seeking declaratory and injunctive help and they made the District attorney the defendant. Both, John and Mary

Issues: Throughout the trail process on behalf of the court the inquiry for exceptions to the charge inaccuracy developed regarding instructions. The appellant was seeking a claim based of the defense of his

Finally, Sucklal argues that she was denied an adequate opportunity to be heard with respect to the motions hearings on September 26, 2013, and September 5, 2014. At the outset we note that an appellant has a responsibility to cite us to “the facts material to a determination of the questions presented.” Md. Rule 8-504(a)(4). Indeed, “we cannot be expected to delve through the record to unearth factual support favorable to the appellant.” Rollins v. Capital Plaza Assoc., L.P., 181 Md. App. 188, 201 (2008). In her brief, Sucklal makes bald assertions that she was denied due process, but fails to articulate the specific circumstances that give rise to such claims. The deficiencies in the arguments notwithstanding, after a through review

Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss their action against the Defendants under K.S.A 60-241(b). Defendants have opposed this motion because they feel it would be unfair to them because 1) it would not settle the issues in the case, 2) it would deny the Defendants further discovery, and 3) it represents only a partial dismissal of the case because the Court would maintain the protective order. This memo is divided in two main parts. The first part discusses both dismissals without and with prejudice and considers the advantages and disadvantages of both. To choose, which to go with the main question will be balancing the risk of the Court imposing expenses as a condition of dismissal vs. the State foreclosing its ability to re-file

Woods filed a K.S.A. § 60-1507 motion for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed; res judicata barred his claim, and even if it did not, “Woods failed to overcome the strong presumption that his attorneys sufficiently investigated [the witness’s] proposed trial testimony.” Woods filed a second § 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that “a colorable claim of actual innocence” required the district court to reconsider the merits of his

Griggs, the defendant, then decided to appeal to the courts, claiming they erred by rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, determining the child witnesses were competent to testify , admitting hearsay testimony from various witnesses, denying his request for a continuance, and admitting evidence under W.R.E. 404(b). The Supreme Court responded by affirming, holding “(1) the district court did not err by (i) rejecting Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (ii) determining that the child witnesses were competent to testify, (iii) denying Defendant’s requests for continuances, and (iv) admitting other bad acts evidence under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) the district court erred in allowing the admission of some hearsay testimony at trial, but the errors were harmless; and (3) Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not

The Law Offices of Luks, Santaniello, Petrillo & Jones, appearing specially on behalf of Norman Henson, Jr. and without waiving jurisdiction in the instant matter files this Motion to Quash Service of Process in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Default and in support thereof states the following:

Md. Rule 2-402(b)(2). The merits of Respondents’ contentions are addressed in Parts I (B), infra. Nevertheless, the plethora of notice that 50NL has received regarding the grounds for Respondents’ objection is more than sufficient so as to permit this Court to reach the questions as to whether the requested discovery is unduly burdensome or costly, and whether 50NL’s need outweighs the burden and cost.

evidence with regard to the issue. The Supreme Court believed the respondent was denied due