The Army Campaign Plan

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

2. In the JCIDS process, what is the role of concepts in developing capabilities? As part of your answer, provide an example of how a concept drove an actual capability in one of the DOTMLPF domains.

The United States Army is a complex organization made up of several commands and managed by different command levels. The U.S. Army is an organization different from that of a business in many unique ways. Specific examples of these differences include: financial reporting, disciplinary review procedures, and tactical operations. Although different in many ways, the Army shares many similar characteristics of a normal profit business. Army personnel are managed by supervisors arranged in a command structure similar to that of a business hierarchy. The Army will also encounter internal and external factors that could impede or enhance operations. As such, planning, organizing, leading, and controlling must be used by managers appropriately

During arduous combat operations coinciding with a high OPTEMPO unit cohesion may flux toward a detriment of mission success. This report will focus on the 56TH Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in order to address the critical leadership problem. In addition, focus will center on relevant facts and assumptions that led to the critical leadership problem and rectify the issues. Furthermore, a new ABCT vision will be published in order to restructure the organizational culture toward a unified purpose and an increase in esprit de corps. (Verify with lesson for correct purpose)

For the next 10-15 years, leadership development is critical within the military. Training to develop agile leaders will yield a competitive advantage within both private and public organizations. Importantly, leadership training should mirror as if one would fight in the new Era International Security Environment. Such tenacity will confront limited engagements in the next 10 years, plus a great deal of offensive operations in the 15 years. Therefore, trained leaders are flexible to their changing missions, roles, and responsibilities, thus are more adaptive to compelling new conflicts.

Leadership goals should always contain methods of a continuous process of learning through education, training, and individual experiences that help ensure that the message will be communicated in a confident and competent manner when leading troops. Soldiers tend to follow leaders that demonstrate and live the Army values, while displaying their confidence in every decision that affects change. Leaders are not born as organizational or tactical leaders; but grown by their genetic determinism, which is inside and the characteristics they work toward; that mold is which type leader they will become. Not just anyone can lead; you must have the desire to lead, be willing to make the commitment to being a leader, and prepare yourself properly, then you have the desire to become a leader. (Fulton, 1995).

Being a leader is always a challenge, and assuming a new command is challenging. There are a lot of expectations to me as a leader. The organization has selected me to a new position, and they believe I fulfill their standards for their leaders. The organization trust and expect me to lead, develop and achieve. My superiors and subordinates have a lot of expectations. They expect me to lead them in the best way to solve our assigned missions. In my new assignment as commander of 4th Armor Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), the main critical leadership problems are the lack of cohesive teams, ethical and work standards and the level of stress. I will through analyze explain and defend my selection of critical leadership problems and apply a model for solving them, including implementing and measuring my vision as the new brigade commander.

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

From the earliest recorded history, humans have waged war upon one another. To conquer and expand their empires, military leaders have experimented with hundreds upon hundreds of tactics and theories about how to wage these wars. The United States Army has refined and crafted the science of warfare and the art of leadership, designing six ‘warfighting functions’ that interrelate with each other. These warfighting functions shape the way an United States Army Officer plans for combat. The six warfighting functions are Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection. The use of these functions can be directly related to the success of many victories the United States has seen, not only on the War level, but also for specific battles. In researching the Siege of Yorktown, it is clear to see that these warfighting functions were key to the victory of the siege. This decisive victory legitimized the then freshly founded United States of America.

The Armed Forces of the United States stand at an inflection point. Fourteen years of sustained combat forged a seasoned force capable of success across the range of military operations from military engagement to joint and multinational major combat operations. Today, this seasoned force is tasked to reset from a decade plus of counterinsurgency operations and evolve capability and capacity to defend the Nation from an increasingly complex security environment. Furthermore, this transformation must be completed in the face of a stark fiscal federal budget.

Summary: In this article the authors are addressing future leaders, and they immediately inform the reader that because there is more complexity considerably more complex issues and technologies than a century ago in the operational military environment, there is a great need for military leaders to achieve autonomy in terms of adapting to and learning about the evolving environment. In short, leaders must be smarter and better prepared for a changing world.

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

Adaptive leadership is becoming widespread in the United States Army amongst junior officers in leadership positions that require quick thinking and innovation. Leonard Wong discusses how the versatile and unpredictable enemy and situations in Iraq produces adaptable junior officers. These officers are learning to make decisions under chaotic conditions and are becoming more mentally agile. The Army is changing. The Army is transforming its capabilities in the war in Iraq to be effective and successful. General Schoomaker states that we will not accomplish our goals as a nation in the 21st century unless our Army becomes much more agile but with the capacity for long term, sustained level of conflict. The Army is in the process of

Therefore, it is important to reform current organizational deficiencies which hinder current cyber-warfare efforts, adopt a new doctrine relevant to the new threat, and make cyber-warfare one of the United States Government’s top national security priorities.

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution