6. Problems in insurance markets Consider the following story: Province Ranch, an industry leading provider in vehicle insurance, recently expanded to cover motorhomes. Province Ranch had concerns that the most likely motorhome insurance customers are those who drive their motorhomes in high-density traffic areas (thus exposing them to the most damage on the road), because they would benefit most from insurance coverage. Since Province Ranch is unable to distinguish perfectly between high-risk and low-risk areas, it raised its motorhome premiums in an effort to account for the riskier drivers. The economic problem in this story is known as: Adverse selection Screening O Signaling Moral hazard

6. Problems in insurance markets Consider the following story: Province Ranch, an industry leading provider in vehicle insurance, recently expanded to cover motorhomes. Province Ranch had concerns that the most likely motorhome insurance customers are those who drive their motorhomes in high-density traffic areas (thus exposing them to the most damage on the road), because they would benefit most from insurance coverage. Since Province Ranch is unable to distinguish perfectly between high-risk and low-risk areas, it raised its motorhome premiums in an effort to account for the riskier drivers. The economic problem in this story is known as: Adverse selection Screening O Signaling Moral hazard

ECON MICRO

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337000536

Author:William A. McEachern

Publisher:William A. McEachern

Chapter14: Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Information, And Behavioral Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3.8P

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How can moral hazard lead to more costly insurance premiums than one was expected?
In an insurance system, would you expect each person to receive in benefits pretty much what they pay in premiums or is it just that the average benefits paid will equal the average premiums paid?
6 Which of the following concepts can be used to characterise the relationship between an insurer and insurance applicants? a. Nash equilibrium b. asymmetric information c. Pareto efficiency d. firm-specific assets e. employment rent
6. Suppose that there are two types of drivers: reckless and safe. Reckless drivers have a higher probability of accidents with an expected loss to the insurance company of $5000. Safe drivers have a lower probability of accidents with an expected loss to the insurance company of $1000. Insurer cannot distinguish between reckless and safe drivers but know that reckless drivers make up "B" proportion of all drivers. What single premium should the risk-neutral insurer charge? Assume that the insurance market is perfectly competitive. Is the above mentioned problem an example of Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard? Explain.
24. Consider adverse selection in the car insurance market. Drivers are either risky or safe. The insurance companies cannot distinguish between the two types of drivers, but they know that 50% of all drivers are risky. Insuring a risky driver costs $3,000, while insuring a safe driver costs $1,000. The benefits of insurance is $4,000 for a risky driver and $1,500 for a safe driver. If insurers cannot observe the type of buyer they are insuring, what is the minimum equilibrium price of insurance? a. $1,000 b. $1,500 c. $2,000 d. $3,000 e. $4,000
14. In attempting to quantify its attitude toward risk, top management of the pharmaceutical company has reported certainty equivalent values for a variety of 50–50 risks. These are summarized in the following table. Outcome of 50-50 Risk Certainty Equivalent $200 and $0 $ 50 $200 and $50 112 $50 and $0 13 $200 and $112 153 $112 and $50 70 $50 and $13 28 $112 and $13 50 For instance, the company's CE for a 50-50 risk between $200 million and $0 is $50 million, and so on. a. Use these responses to determine utility values for each of the monetary valucs in the sccond column. (Hint: Set U($200) = 100 and U($0) = 0. Show that U($50) = 50, U($112) = 75, and so on.) Construct a utility graph by plotting points and drawing a smooth curve. (You may wish to check the utility values in Problem 13 against your curve.) *b. Consider the mathematical utility function U = 7.1 Vy, where U is the utility value corresponding to monetary outcome y. Check that this function is an accurate description of…
2 Scenario Your client, InsureCorp, is an insurance company considering launching an 'income insur- ance' product in the nation of Motherland. Income insurance is a product that fully insures a household against changes in income caused by a major injury or illness. At present, no businesses are selling income insurance products in Motherland. Initial market research suggests that there are 15,000 households in Motherland interested in purchasing income insurance. Your client expects that the fixed cost of launching the income insurance product will be $25,000,000 per year, and that each policy issued to a customer will cost the company an additional $2,000 in sales commissions. 2.1 Your task Your client wants you to analyse the potential market for income insurance and report on the following: What is the maximum price the company can charge a household for an income insurance policy? What is the expected profit (or loss) for the company if it becomes a monopoly provider of income…
7. Individual Problems 16-6 Pharmaceutical Benefits Managers (PBMs) are intermediaries between upstream drug manufacturers and downstream insurance companies. They design formularies (lists of drugs that insurance will cover) and negotiate prices with drug companies. PBMs want a wider variety of drugs available to their insured populations, but at low prices. Suppose that a PBM is negotiating with the makers of two nondrowsy allergy drugs, Claritin and Allegra, for inclusion on the formulary. The "value" or "surplus" created by including one nondrowsy allergy drug on the formulary is $228 million, but the value of adding a second drug is only $68 million. Assume the PBM bargains by telling each drug company that it's going to reach an agreement with the other drug company. Under the non-strategic view of bargaining, the PBM would earn a surplus of of $ million. million, while each drug company would earn a surplus Now suppose the two drug companies merge. What is the likely postmerger…
7 Consider a supply chain with the manufacturer, the retailer and end-users, using a buy-back contract, as below cost-benefit & demand forecasting details: F=$120,000 ; c=$30 ; w=$75 ; b=$50 ; p=$122 ; s=$15; Demand 1,800 1,920 2,040 2,160 Probability 26% 27% 29% 18% Calculate the retailer’s marginal profit, retailer’s marginal loss, manufacturer’s marginal profit. Calculate the expected profit of the retailer and the manufacturer for 4 above-mentioned demand scenarios. Then, conclude on which production quantity Q to maximize manufacturer’s expected profit, which production quantity Q to maximize retailer’s expected profit.
1)Describe an example of moral hazard that we may run into in the real world. Think of something that is legal and not inherently lethal, yet still demonstrates elevated risk for the participant who would likely act safer if insurance or protection was not available. Explain why someone might take this risky action. What are the benefits to the risky behavior? In your response to two of your peers, explain what an insurance company may do to reduce the likelihood that an individual would take this risk. Keep in mind, that we cannot always just deny coverage if an individual is participating in the risky behavior.
(1) How would a private insurance carrier respond to a client that always took extreme risks and frequently submitted large claims?
A9 Describe an example of adverse selection that we may run into in the real world. How does adverse selection impact the policy holders for this specific type of insurance for: High risk participants? Low risk participants? What is one government regulation that has been enacted in the last 20 years that helps either high risk or low risk policy holders in the United States