Suppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer

Suppose the government imposes a Wellness Tax τ > 0, on robust and frail types but collects on this tax only when they are healthy (that is, there is no tax if they turn out to be sick). Will a separating equilibrium still be possible? Draw a version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz diagram to support your answer

Microeconomics A Contemporary Intro

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285635101

Author:MCEACHERN

Publisher:MCEACHERN

Chapter4: Demand, Supply, And Markets

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6QFR

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