Henry V Character Analysis

James R. McDonough sets a spectacular example of what it is to be a second lieutenant in the United States Army and what it is truly like to lead a group of enlisted soldiers for the first time. Lieutenant McDonough, a graduate of West Point, was deployed as a platoon leader in a small fort with the mission of holding a Vietnamese village out of the hands of the Viet Cong. When he arrived, Lieutenant McDonough discovered that the former Lieutenant and platoon leader of the 2d Platoon, Bravo Company, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) hardly ever left his

COL (R) Christopher Kolenda commanded an excellent group of men and women in combat during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the 1-91 Cavalry (Airborne) Squadron, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). In 2007 – 08 the 1-91 CAV deployed to Afghanistan, under his leadership and guidance he provided a strategy for his Officers and Senior Non-commissioned Officers. He was able to articulate his vision for successfully accomplishing the mission at hand by building a cohesive team through trust, a shared understanding and providing a clear intent. By providing a clear intent Senior NCO’s were able to implement his guidance and conduct successful missions. COL (R) Kolenda provided mentorship and guidance not only to Officers but also Senior NCO’s; along with CSM Pedraza they were able to trust and allow Senior NCO’s to conduct their duties with little to no supervision. During his command with 1-91 CAV he was able to implement an innovative approach to counterinsurgency by employing locally tailored combinations of armed diplomacy, conflict resolution, personal relationships, and high degrees of leverage, 1-91 CAV dramatically improved the instability in Kunar and Nuristan

The most important imperative of four in the Army Campaign Plan is “develop leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century” because in the future leaders will deal a “tough realistic environment” and must be willing to adapt to the mission, threat or operational environment. We must “train soldiers and leaders to ensure they are prepared to accomplish the mission across the range of military operations while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations . This is the eighth of twenty Army Warfighting Challenges enduring first order problems, the solutions to which will improve current and future force combat effectiveness. These challenges are reviewed and updated as needed to remain applicable for the future force.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully

Though serving in a highly disciplined, well trained, and well equipped force, I faced mental and physical adversity, a numerically superior enemy, and a dynamic battlefield. I served with fellow Noncommissioned Officers and leaders with vast tactical combat experience, but we were operating in highly restrictive terrain behind enemy lines. As we worked to create breathing room for the Battle Space Owner and defeat the insurgents on their own turf, we took several casualties and would be tested in our ability to remain equally dynamic to the battlefield, bring every asset to bare to accomplish the mission, and adapt our common tactics in order to survive.

The culture and climate of a well-disciplined unit should be apparent by its strong core values and attributes displayed by its unit members. Recruiting and processing qualified applicants with good moral values and strong character traits is where it starts. In addition, Basic Combat Training (BCT) further strengthens a Soldier’s moral fiber, focuses on building strong leadership skills, and instills the core values of the Army. The Army needs “standard bearers,” not Soldiers and Leaders who choose the easy wrong over the hard right. Providing proper training and honest feedback will create competence in our military ethics. We need Soldiers and Leaders of strong character that will teach, coach, and mentor the next generation of leaders. A positive command climate and demanding culture is the substance of developing unit cohesion and esprit de corps. Army ethics will continue to struggle if it does not have leaders at every level to enforce the importance of its core values and principles. A strong culture and positive climate play a vital role in shaping our force for the future.

I am Joseph Maruska, I am currently a Major in the United States Air Force. This essay will introduce you to my personal command philosophy. It will also summarize and analyze a brief interview recently conducted with a current squadron commander using my own leadership philosophy as a guide. Throughout this essay I will draw upon my own personal experiences and thoughts, lessons discussed throughout the Leadership and Command Course, as well the discussion with a current squadron commander. Leadership and command styles come in many different forms and there is not necessarily a correct or incorrect way to lead depending on your organization or current turn of events. This essay is simply my thoughts after being in the Air Force for the last eleven years.

All leaders in the group will concentrate on the mental and physical wellness of Soldiers and subordinate officers. Contingent upon the recent training and the information acquired from the previous deployment, commanders and NCOs continue to arrange and plan for reintegration of Soldiers and families, recuperation of gear and new hardware preparing, and the accession of new Soldiers. All collective training requirements above section or team level for units will stop. Subordinate officers and NCOs develop, arrange, perform, and evaluate training in fundamental skills at the individual, crew and section level. Management of the unit will decentralize, giving junior officers the scope to oversee training within the brigade commander's objective. Leaders direct Soldiers to professional military education and functional training to cover the capacity gaps experienced in the previous deployment. Officers create and execute their tactics to prepare, teach, and give the right encounters to subordinate officers, which for the most part is individual training and education, team building, and developing the 4th ABCT to conduct collective training in the next phase. Officers and NCOs evaluate the development, formulation, and implementation of the individual and small-team training done by juniors and give

While serving as a Squad Leader in a 70-man Small Unit Ranger Tactics program (SURT), I was responsible for the individual and collective training of a 13-man Infantry Squad. I performed as an instructor as well as a Platoon and individual assessment evaluator. I was responsible for the accountability and maintenance of all assigned equipment in excess of $200,000 and capable of deploying worldwide in 18 hours as a member of the Regimental Headquarters Security Team. While assigned to SURT I helped to bring up the graduation rate of Rangers through Ranger School from 55% to 73%. I helped to prepare over 960 Soldiers for integration into the Ranger Leadership School over 16 SURT classes. I carried out the additional duties as a Company Jump

Above reproach throughout this rating period. He could always be counted on to do what is right, despite the multifaceted logistical demands he encountered ISO peak troop surges. He created an environment conducive to professional Soldier development through counseling, coaching and mentorship. He fostered a command climate that supported the objectives of EO, EEO and SHARP program.

The Army is in a period of transitioning to a new construct on how it trains and employs Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). This new idea is called Regionally Aligned Forces (RAFs). The basic concept for RAFs is to align BCTs to a Combatant Commander (COCOM) for use as needed by that COCOM. By being aligned to a COCOM, the BCT and its respective Soldiers will receive specific region cultural and language training and also be provided specific training focus as determined by that COCOM. On a rotational basis units within those regionally aligned BCTs will deploy to their designated region to support the COCOM and in return the unit and Soldiers receive invaluable experiences and realistic training. This essay is to discuss how the Army’s move to RAFs is a great strategic move for the Army on many fronts. Listed are a few of the fronts that the transition to regionally aligned forces addresses. As the Army draws down its forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) it has to find ways to remain relevant and useful in a time of budget reductions, smaller conflicts and greater uncertainty across the Department of Defense (DoD). With the reduction in size of the Army and the contraction of forces stationed abroad, there needs to be a plan to address this cultural exposure our forces are losing. In addition, the Army needs to preserve the lessons learned over a decade at war and not fall back into a garrison mindset where realistic training becomes unrealistic and worthless.

The mission command of the Battalion Headquarters, company, and the platoon is to provide the most realistic training. Thus, improving the training performance across the Combat Brigades Units. Moreover, this practical training builds on positive reinforcement of training objectives, identifies the errors on the training battlefield, subsequently enhancing the survival rate on the actual battlefield (Operation Group, 2017).

CPT Nobles was the lead planner representing one of 48 concepts and capabilities examined during the Army Warfighting Assessment (AWA) 17.1 at Ft. Bliss, TX. Ben synchronized the efforts of a 15 man team from four different organizations across all Army components. He took 10 analytical observations from the tactical level exercise and developed recommendations including potential solutions to improve warfighting capability at the tactical and operational level echelons.

As an officer in the United States Army, one is charged with leading soldiers, this is no simple task and comes with its fair share of difficulties. The difficulty of this task is no excuse for reckless behavior nor is it an excuse for overbearing standards. An officer should expect the best from his soldiers, but one must not act in a way that Sobel did by expecting the impossible. A way in which one prevents this from happening is clear communication with the chain of command and self-discipline. An officer must possess the self-discipline and self-regulation when he is dealing with anyone, especially his own soldiers. It is very important to set a maintainable bar for his soldiers to reach, and only when there is a clear deviance from these standards should an officer take action.