Ronaldo 's Acceptance Of Goods By Benjamin

Mr. Slim Jim verbally submitted an offer to Mr. Potbelly who proceeded to accept Mr. Slim Jims’ offer unequivocally (pg. 122). The “Basic Requirements of a Contract” (pg. 107) were completed. In this bilateral contract (pg. 107), “Communication of Acceptance” (pg. 123) was evident as Mr. Potbelly responded “Sure I’ll take it” when Mr. Slim Jim submitted an offer for the pottery and enthusiastically replied “I’ll take it!” when Mr. Slim Jim gave him an offer of cash for his home. As a result of this, Mr. Slim Jim is suing for the “right to obtain specific performance” asking that the agreement be upheld. Also, according to “admissions” (one of the “exceptions to the statutes of frauds” (pg. 175) Mr. Potbelly’s agreement should be upheld.

There were number of contraventions in this case. The first issue was regarding paying the 10% of proceeds as the carriage cost pertaining to the wheat contracts to Alia. This was later paid to the government. Alia was an intermediary company aiding in the completion of the overall dealings related to the case under analysis. Iraq was able to get the hard currency from this. Provisions were made to reimburse the payment portion received by AWB which further strengthened the ability to accumulate hard currency. In other words, the money from escrow account of UN was being used for purposes which were other than making payment for the commodities not permitted (Austin and Reynolds, 2012).

Held: He was not entitled to commission for the period when he sold other supplier's goods.

15–1. Liquidated Damages. Carnack contracts to sell his house and lot to Willard for $100,000. The terms of the contract call for Willard to make a deposit of 10 percent of the purchase price as a down payment. The terms further stipulate that if the buyer breaches the contract, Carnack will retain the deposit as liquidated damages. Willard makes the deposit, but because her expected financing of the $90,000 balance falls through, she breaches the contract. Two weeks later, Carnack sells the house and lot to Balkova for $105,000. Willard demands her $10,000 back, but Carnack refuses, claiming that Willard’s breach and the contract terms entitle him to keep the deposit. Discuss who is correct. (See Damages.)

[Facts] On February 1st, Bernie put his 2006 Ford Fusion up for sale. Vivian contacted Bernie on March 1st interested in purchasing his vehicle. Bernie extended an invitation to Vivian on March 5th for them to meet in order to further discuss negotiations. Vivian met up with Bernie at his place of residence on March 10th, they agreed on a purchase price of $12,500. Vivian informed Bernie that she needed an additional three weeks in order to obtain the funds. Bernie agreed to give Vivian until March 31st to purchase the vehicle under the condition that she put down a $1,000 deposit. Vivian agreed to the contract terms written by Bernie as

• Contracts were exchanged on 2 May 2005 for the purchase of property for $2,130,000 between the plaintiffs and the first defendant.

36. Principle of Law: The transaction between Browne and Houlihan was just under negotiation process and not form the contract. Browne did not acknowledge Houlihan’s e-mail and did not reply to accept Houlihan’s request, so he sold the television set to another. Houlihan then purchased a new set more expensive than Browne’s set. Both of them didn’t break the contract because there’s no contract between them. Therefore Houlihan had no legal basis to sue Browne for $1,000.

* If the arrangement includes a general right of return relative to the delivered item, where the delivery or

In Brown’s Provisional Constitution, Article XXVIII: Property states, “All captured or confiscated property, and all property the product of the labor of those belonging to this organization and of their families, shall be held as the property of the whole, equally, without distinction; and may be used for the common benefit, or disposed of for the same object;” (Earle, 2008)

from the government and that he was the rightful owner. There is no paper evidence since

In this case, Kallessi Mc Tavish is the principal, Maya Stork is the agent and the new suppliers are the third party. Firstly, this is a case of ratification as all the requirements of ratification are met, i.e. there is a clear principal in existence. This requirement can be contradicted with the case of Kelner V Baxter 1866 LR 2 CP 174, where the directors ordered goods before the company was even formed and so could not be held to pay for the goods. Principal is in capacity. Ratification is timeous and can be contradicted with the case Goodall V Bilsland 1909 SC 1152, where the solicitor had 10 days to appeal against a license renewal of a wine merchant and won the case but the wine merchant appealed against this as the solicitor didn’t

On the present case being addressed to the International Court of Justice in dealing with the matter of sovereignty over the Island of Manca, the issue of legality belonging to which side of the parties at dispute is put forward. The problem however, lies in, the period at which the dispute took place, for International law has not evolved at that time unlike in this day and age.

The Sales of Goods Act 1893 provides the definition of ‘condition’ and ‘warranty’. During the period between 1893 to 1962 both ‘condition’ and ‘warranty’ was generally accepted that they were the only two types of terms which assist in ‘identifying the breaches which entitled the injured party to terminate the contract. In the turning point of 1962, a new type of term-intermediate term brought about a whole new page into the Law of Contract. Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd vs Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd is the key case which owns the credit for this discovery. In the case, the ship owner hired out the Hong Kong fir, ‘being in every way fitted for ordinary cargo service’. The ship was delivered on 13 February 1957, sailing

In Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts (1987) Megarry J held that in order to found a claim for knowing receipt, the defendant had to have actual knowledge that his receipt was in breach of trust or was ‘willfully blind’ shutting his eyes to the obvious; or willfully and

L & Co dispatched the goods on credit to Blenkarn, who resold 250 dozen to Cundy. Blenkarn did not pay for the goods. L & Co sued Cundy to recover the handkerchiefs. It was held that the contract between L & Co and Blenkarn was void for unilateral mistake. L & Co intended to deal with Blenkiron & Co, not Blenkarn. Cundy was liable to return the handkerchiefs to L & Co because no right of ownership had passed to him.